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
“The Chinese believe in spirits”: belief and believing
in the study of religion
Catherine M. Bell
A recent round of books, both popular and scholarly, reveal that as a
society we are, once again, fascinated with the issue of belief. While the
more popular books tend to adopt a fairly straightforward and uncom-
plicated notion of believing and then find major problems of rationality,
the more scholarly books readily accept a type of rationality to beliefs
while problematizing the act of believing in other, more involuted ways.
Both types of argument remind the scholar of religion that the academic
discipline of religious studies has not contributed much to this discus-
sion for quite a while. As described in Rodney Needham’s  work,
Belief, Language and Experience, which was both a fulsome anthropologi-
cal treatment of the problems and a cautionary tale for further studies,
the concept of belief poses particular problems for comparative analysis
 Popular titles include Wendy Kaminer’s Sleeping with Extra-Terrestrials: The Rise of Irrationalism
and the Perils of Piety (New York: Pantheon, ); Michael Shermer’s Why People Believe Weird
Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition and Other Confusions of Our Time (New York: W. H. Freeman and
Company,  ) and How We Believe: The Search For God in an Age of Science (New York: W. H.
Freeman and Company, ). Scholarly studies include Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Belief and
Resistance: Dynamics of Contemporary Intellectual Controversy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press,  ); and Umberto Eco, Belief or Non-Belief: A Confrontation (New York: Arcade Publishing,
). Indeed, an unproblematic invocation of belief is one of the informal markers between
popular and professional studies of religion and culture. For an example of a study on the edge
of this divide, see Huston Smith’s popular textbook, The World’s Religions (formerly, Religions of
the World [San Francisco: HarperCollins,  ()]), which describes the main beliefs of each
tradition.
 The major discussions of these issues are Robert Bellah’s Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a
Post-Traditional World (New York: Harper and Row, ); Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and
Experience (University of Chicago Press, ); and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Belief and History
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,  ). For an interesting exchange, see Donald
Wiebe, “On the Transformation of ‘Belief ’ and the Domestication of ‘Faith’ in the Academic
Study of Religion,” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion :– (): – , reprised in
“The Role of ‘Belief ‘ in the Study of Religion,” Numen : (): –, with a response
by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Belief: A Reply to A Response,” Numen  : (): –. For a
useful compendium that addresses belief, see Nancy K. Frankenberry and Hans H. Penner (eds.),




































“The Chinese believe in spirits”: belief and believing 
since belief does not appear to be identifiable or similarly important in
religions we want to compare and from which we want to abstract more
general descriptions. Moreover, it is a commonplace that many of our
assumptions about the centrality of belief in religion have emerged in
a decidedly Christian context, making comparison a distortion of other
religious views. Anthropological studies since Needham have tended to
collapse belief into “culture,” which has worked well enough most of the
time, but it not only avoids the explicit problem of why and how “beliefs”
and “believing” become prominent in the way in which many people
participate in a culture, it also retreats from the problem of various ways
in which any one person may appropriate parts of the culture. Recourse
to the concept of culture not only leaves many of these questions to pop-
ular writers, it also tends to push anthropology into an extreme cultural
relativism that is painfully dependent upon the fragile and often unar-
ticulated nature of this idea of culture. Scholars of religion, on the other
hand, generally want to use the language of belief to say that members
of such-and-such a religion generally hold such-and-such conceptions
that motivate their activities. While people have pointed to the overrid-
ing need for such an abstract language despite ongoing revelations of its
weaknesses, we also know that a term like belief keeps tying any meta-
language to assumptions that are more culturally constrained than we
really care to defend.
Another reason for the field’s hesitation about belief may also lie in
philosophical uses of the term. Philosophical usage tends to emphasize a
more individualistic version of anthropology’s “culture,” and in so doing
deals, at least in passing, with the possibility of idiosyncrasy, madness, or
the intent to delude. Philosophers seeking a language with which to an-
alyze how human beings go about interpreting their world, particularly
the linguistic communications within it, often make use of the concept of
 This point is made by Donald S. Lopez, Jr. in “Belief,” in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Critical Terms for
Religious Studies (), –.
 See Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Taylor (ed.), Critical Terms, –.
 For two explicit examples, see Ludwig Wittgenstein’s comments in his “Lectures on Religious
Belief ” collected in L. Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief,
trans. and ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press,  ), –; his comments
are also available in Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Religious Belief,” in Frankenberry and Penner (eds.),
Language, Truth, and Religious Belief, –. See also the following quotes: “What is the criterion of
reliability, dependability? Suppose you give a general description as to when you say a proposition
has a reasonable weight of probability. When you call it reasonable, is this only to say that for it
you have such and such evidence, and for others you haven’t?” ibid., ; and “For instance, we
don’t trust the account given of an event by a drunk man,” ibid., . Also see Donald Davidson,



































  . 
belief to link it to, or play it off, a notion of truth. Needham discussed the
links and distinctions drawn between belief and truth in the philosoph-
ical tradition stretching from Hume to Wittgenstein, Hampshire, and
Harnack. More recently, Donald Davidson has made liberal use of belief
in his theory of “radical interpretation.” He argues that we cannotmake
sense of a person’s utterances without understanding something of their
intentions and beliefs, but “we cannot infer the belief without knowing
the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without
the belief.” His theory of radical interpretation, therefore, assumes the
interconnectedness of belief and meaning as well as their formal role in
interpretation. For the sake of his larger argument, essentially a theory
about a theory, Davidson focuses on the belief (or “preference”), integral
to interpretation, that the statementsmade by another are or can be true.
In fact, he points out, we must grant other speakers, however aberrant
or idiosyncratic, a great deal of reason and truth, or else we would have
no way to conclude they are being unreasonable or untrue. Davidson
goes on to propose a theory of how we infer belief and meaning, arguing
that the inference that statements can be held to be true cannot be sep-
arate from this basic theory of interpretation. However, philosophical
discussions like Davidson’s, which relate belief and meaning to truth,
however truth is understood, not only seem to threaten religious studies’
post-theological emphasis on the validity of different world-views, they
also appear to threaten to push analysis to the level of the sentence,
from where it appears hard to come to any conclusions about religion in
general.
Despite these fears, the question of how to use the concept of belief,
and how to identify the types of phenomenon potentially illuminated
by such a concept, remains an inescapable aspect of studying religion
within the language traditions that the field of religious studies inherits.
This chapter, which is for me both an initial and perhaps belated foray
into the topic, will explore some unarticulated tendencies in our use of
the notion of belief, and tie our use of this concept to a particular way
of thinking about religion. In the end, I will sketch a possible way to
approach these issues from a rather different direction.
 Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” (), and “Belief and the Basis of Meaning” () in
Inquiries, – and –.
 Ibid., .
 In a section relevant to analyzing some forms of religious beliefs, Davidson suggests that an
indeterminacy of meaning or translation should not be seen as a failure to capture important
distinctions, but rather that these distinctions themselves are not that significant. In other words,


































“The Chinese believe in spirits”: belief and believing 
  
A particularly provocative dimension of Davidson’s analysis of interpre-
tation is the attempt to hold on to two positions that are usually polarized
in such a way as to force a choice of one over the other. On the one hand,
he invokes truth (or reality) as clearly dependent on language (or culture),
a stance that supports many current understandings of cultural pluralism
and relativism, which are compelling and popular positions these days.
On the other hand, Davidson also points to a type of shared rationalism
that enables us to recognize and interpret the meaning of statements
made by others even when the linguistic or cultural overlap is very thin.
By holding on to both positions, Davidson attempts to find something of
a middle way or, rather, as he puts it, to place theories of interpretation
on a new footing. I have read Davidson primarily for this struggle to
hold on to both positions in ways that make sense of what we are looking
at in the study of religion: sometimes it feels like we are encountering
very different realities that lead us to question our own; at other times,
we experience, and point to, a great deal of similarity, although we can
get nervous about that too. In both cases, we wonder what is inevitably
particular and what, if anything, is, has been, or is becoming universal.
When reduced to this formulation, however, Davidson’s project is one
that is widely shared at the moment. Philosophical ethics, in particular,
may be doing the most explicit work on how to think about cultural rel-
ativism without endorsing complete relativism, but there are and have
been other engagements. Among anthropologists, few have tried to
imagine a more explicit convergence of relativism and universalism than
Richard Shweder. In several studies in the s, he groped to identify
all the presuppositions of these polarized positions by delineating and
classifying a wide variety of formulations of each. By making trans-
parent what he saw as the main tensions in the field, Shweder hoped to
elucidate the basic stance and components of a post-positivist, postmod-
ern anthropology. I do not think his conclusion – that anthropological
 The main studies in philosophical ethics are Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, ); Richard Rorty, Objectivity,
Relativism, And Truth: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press, ); and David B. Wong,
Moral Relativity (Berkeley: University of California Press, ).
 Richard A. Shweder, “Anthropology’s Romantic Rebellion Against the Enlightenment, or
There’s More to Thinking than Reason and Evidence,” in Richard A. Shweder and Robert
A. LeVine (eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion (Cambridge University Press,
), –; and Richard A. Shweder, “Post-Nietzschian Anthropology: The Idea of Multiple
Objective Worlds,” in Michael Krauz (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame


































  . 
theorists should adopt a “transcendencewithout superiority” fromwhich
they should “take ‘literally’ (as a matter of belief ) those reality-posits so
alien in order to discover other realities within the self ” – is either satis-
fying or successful. Yet the effort was fascinating, instructive, and bold.
Religious studies, especially the history of religions, has also addressed
the issue of universalismandparticularismand, likemost academic fields,
it has probably been formed by the tension between them. The differ-
entiation of the study of religion from theology more than fifty years ago
was one early engagement of the issue, by which an emerging “history of
religions” approach felt its way to what was arguably a type of universal-
ized theology and a fresh, if incomplete, particularization of Christianity
and its siblings. When the field began to focus more on methods of com-
parison, it took another angle on these polarized options, asking several
related questions: are all religions comparable manifestations of some
type of universal, such as homo religiosus or the sacred? should we be com-
paring to illuminate the universal or the particular or, somehow, both?
and what can be adequately compared to what for what end? With the
more recent emergence of linguistic and cognitive theories, as well as
studies effectively deconstructing universal narratives, one wonders if
there is any other issue so responsible for what we do and how we do
it today. In no small way, scholarship understands itself as both a ve-
hicle for identifying particularism (we sometimes regarded ourselves as
“liberating” it) and forging formulations of an underlying or abstract uni-
versalism. The emphasis may shift back and forth, but each, as Davidson
might suggest, is impossible to infer without the other.

According to recent critiques, “religion” is anover-reaching folk category
thatmisreads and evendoes violence to other cultures. This is, of course,
a corrective, and undoubtedly a slightly exaggerated one, which has the
merit of addressing the many liberties we have taken with the term for
so long. Yet these critiques leave two concerns unanswered.
 Shweder, “Post-Nietzschian Anthropology,” .
 Michael J. Buckley, SJ, “The Study of Religion and theRhetoric of Atheism: A Paradox,” unpub-
lished manuscript (); also see Tomoko Masuzawa, “From Theology to World Religions,” in
Tim Jensen and Mikael Rothstein (eds.), Secular Theories on Religion: Current Perspectives (University
of Copenhagen Press, ), –.
 Among those who have addressed this topic, let me simply note Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion:
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,


































“The Chinese believe in spirits”: belief and believing 
First, several centuries of talking about “religion in general” has cre-
ated a sense of religion in many places that might, arguably, have cat-
egorized things differently without such influence. It is not so easy to
recontain the term “religion” at this point in history. It may be just an-
other form of hegemonic imperialism to claim, for example, that the
Chinese today are wrong or deluded in using the word “religion” to
describe either past or current practices in their culture. If we are to be
clear about the historicity of such terminology, we must follow through
and track how the concept is being used today beyond our own theoriz-
ing. We know there are no Platonic theoretical categories, but we keep
thinking we can freeze them for this study or that critique.
Second, I work in the materials of a culture that has long constituted a
good example of classifications that do not fit the Euro-American under-
standing of religion, namely China. Yet, if one looks beyond the careful
slices of Chinese culture that are usually chosen as representative, one
can findmuch that is not completely alien to any definition of “religion,”
medieval, enlightenment, or postmodern. It can be refreshing, of course,
to drop the notion of religion out of the picture as completely as possi-
ble, and either explore the variety of Chinese categories that have been
used or fish for other ways of identifying what is either comparable or
distinguishable among practices.
These concerns notwithstanding, the attempt to demote “religion”
from a universal (the “consensus of nations”), a biological facility, or a
cognitive structure to a theory of the specific classificatory organization
of a particular culture helps to illuminate some of the problems attending
our language of belief and meaning. In the same way, I want to suggest,
our language about belief and meaning is part of an understanding of
religion that keeps reasserting itself because a tense relationship between
universalism and particularism – whether or not it is the type of solution
sought by Davidson and Shweder, among others – may be integral to
theoretical projects as we have culturally cast them. Even if we pay full
attention to the historicity of the social system examined, as well as the
historicity of the project of examining it, it is not clear that we secure a
 One has only to recall the popularity and fecundity of Jorge Luis Borges’s fanciful description of
a Chinese encyclopedia, which was identified as Chinese to locate such wonderfully exotic and
still totally alien difference. I will only note here Michel Foucault’s use of the image in The Order
of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, ), xv. One of the stronger
arguments against the Western terminology of religion for understanding Chinese religion is
given in Jordan Paper’s The Spirits are Drunk: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Religion (Albany:
State University of New York Press, ), especially –, even though Paper argues that the
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footing for scholarship that drops the allure of transcendence as another
version of the particularism–universalism polarity.
While we have tended to use “religion” to denote a dimension of open-
ended commonality, something found in most if not all human cultures,
we have used the term “belief ” in the highly tailored, supporting role
of denoting the culturally particular foci of a religion – specifically those
things that we hold to not exist in fact. If a group “believes” in less partic-
ular or empirically problematic things like love or the tragic dimensions
of life, we tend to refer to these not as beliefs, but as cultural values,
attitudes, or dispositions. If a group holds convictions about astrological
destiny, we are very willing to describe such attitudes as beliefs, not as
culture. Belief is our characterization of the specific illusions of others.
But the distinction between belief and culture is not dramatically de-
marcated: belief is also our shorthand for the epitome of what we see as
being encultured, culture-bound, or culturally determined.
We explain a culturally particular belief, and that is a very redundant
phrase, by its place in a structured systemof ideas thatwe assemble. In this
way, we see what the belief “means.” Since the objects of the beliefs do
not actually exist in our view, there is no other route for meaning; so the
meaningfulness of beliefs is dependent upon rendering them coherent
within a system of ideas. Coherent systems of belief create a meaningful
structure, namely “religion,” which makes sense to us of the particular
and the illusionary. This can be a very circular way to work.
In connection with this tendency to identify belief with extremes of
cultural particularism and determinism, we also talk about belief as a
type of deeply held mental orientation or conviction. That is, belief is
described as one type of thing, an all-or-nothing, on-or-off state. There
is little evidence to warrant such a view outside of certain specific con-
fessional practices. Both formulations of belief, as the illusion rendered
meaningful when made part of a larger coherent system understood as
religion and as a state of deeply held convictions, emerge in Shweder’s
argument that the interpretation of beliefs is the central anthropological
question – and its fault-line. He evokes the “witch” question that lies at
the root of anthropology, namely, if your informant tells you, perhaps at
some risk of negative consequences, that she or he is actually a witch,
what can you make of this statement when your own reality makes clear
 In his  study, Ilongot Headhunting –: A Study in Society and History (Stanford University
Press, ), Renato Rosaldo’s recognition of the problems with anthropological analysis led



































“The Chinese believe in spirits”: belief and believing 
there are no witches? Generally, we must reconstruct the system of
ideas that rationalize and render such statements coherent if we are to
“interpret” them. This is a true advance, of course, on the earlier view
that such statements are proof of some sort of “primitive mentality.”
Yet it is hard to be convinced that an interpretation in which a belief,
taken as a designated illusion that is nonetheless a “type” of truth, that is,
as having its own particular reality, is all that different from interpreta-
tions based on a primitivementality. Neither do I think anything is solved
by concluding, as Shweder does, that unquestionably the informant is a
witch.
A third problematic assumption, which I have addressed at length
elsewhere, is the ease with which we grant belief a prior existence in
order to cast it as the a priori shaper and instigator of action. While
belief may well work this way some of the time, we have no evidence that
this happens most of the time. Such an assumption, however, does allow
us to “explain” action by connecting it to its motivating beliefs, and from
there to a larger reconstructed system, understood to be “the” relevant
system by its coherence and ability to explain the particulars with which
the interpreter started.

It is a relatively recent thing for scholars to emphasize meaningful and
systemic coherence in relation to what religion is all about. Only in the
second half of the twentieth century, for the most part, has the pro-
vision of coherence been seen as the defining role of religion, that is,
what we theorists think it should do when religion clearly can no longer
explain the nature of the universe or act as the authoritative source of
morality. And this is not just the stance of theorists. When I quiz my
 Shweder, “Post-Nietzschian Anthropology,” –. It is interesting to note the difference
between the interpretive tasks represented by Shweder’s witch claim, on the one hand, and
Davidson’s examples ( pace Tarski?), on the other, in which he ponders the interpretive process
involved in understanding Kurt’s statement, es regnet, and Karl’s statement, es schneit (Davidson,
Inquiries into Truth,  and ).
 For a thorough history of this ethnographic view and its relationship to cross-cultural interpreta-
tion of irrational statements, see Jonathan Z. Smith, “I am a Parrot (Red)” inMap Is Not Territory:
Studies in the History of Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, ; reprint  ), –.
 Shweder, “Post-Nietzschian Anthropology,” –. For Shweder, “cultural anthropology will
probably come to an end when it comes up with an incontestable answer to the witch question”
().
 Catherine Bell,Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press, ), esp. –.
 Influences on the interpretive importance of coherence have been Peter L. Berger’s argu-
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students, completely unread in the relevant anthropological literature,
meaningful coherence is what they also have absorbed as the expected
role and real contribution of religion. They lament that they have not
found it or a sufficiently steady experience of it. They are particularly
aware of, and appalled by, what they see as the rampant incoherence –
the fragmentation, hypocrisy, or compromises – in the lives of adults
around them. For these students, as for most scholars of religion, religion
should have a holistic coherence that delivers meaningful experiences.
Yet even those who have devoted their lives to religion – the clergy of
many different persuasions – rarely find those qualities in their religious
experience if you ask them. Coherence can be found only in some
explicit self-presentations by persons, texts, or institutions. We can ar-
gue for the existence of a “deeper” coherence, of course, either in the
organization of the brain, the personal psyche, the social structure, or
the dynamics of culture – all universalizations that support the major
theories and disciplines of the twentieth century. Awkward to use today,
but still regularly invoked, these approaches contrast with attempts to see
beliefs and believing as a matter of specific sets of actions or situations,
that is, approaching believing as a type of social practice rather than a
(true or false) linguistic statement or mental conviction.
To indulge an autobiographical example, I originally thought to study
religion because I was interested in how most people – that is, folks not
schooled in the language and history of philosophy – made sense of their
lives andworlds. I have not been heavily invested in any particular formu-
lation of this focus, just in the general human project implied, which has
to include how readily people get by without giving much attention to
making any larger sense of things. It was clear to me growing up among
the natives of Long Island in the s and s – indeed, it was a striking
A Sociology of Religion [New York: Doubleday, ], ); and Clifford Geertz’s arguments about
religions as a system (“Religion as a Cultural System,” in Michael Banton (ed.), Anthropologi-
cal Approaches to the Study of Religion [London: Tavistock, ], reprinted in The Interpretation of
Cultures: Selected Essays [New York: Basic Books, ], –); and, a bit more distant, Claude
Levi-Strauss’s structuralism (e.g., The Savage Mind [University of Chicago Press, ]).
 It is interesting that theorists talk about coherence as something projected, while believers and
would-be believers almost always talk of it as something found. For another discussion of coher-
ence, also see Nancy K. Frankenberry and Hans H. Penner, “Clifford Geertz’s Long-Lasting
Moods,Motivations, andMetaphysicalConceptions,” Journal of Religion (): –, especially
.
 My evidence here is simply personal conversation with clergy, primarily, though not exclusively,
in the Christian, Jewish, and Buddhist traditions.
 Needham suggests this direction, belief as social action, although he does not develop it; anthro-
pology has done a better job at grasping this stance than religious studies, although at the cost
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feature of the religious attitudes there – just how little coherence religion
actually seemed to provide or was even expected to provide. Later, in the
s, coherence became a more explicitly stated expectation, but, as
before, religiosity within the spectrum of conventional lifestyles seemed
to hinge on internalizing a complex array of compartmentalizations and
disassociations.
On Long Island, and in other places I have come to know well, what is
thought of as religion by the natives is more a matter of loosely packaged
sets of behaviors –what we can also call “bundles of behaviors” or “habits
of action.” For Long Islanders, these packaged sets of distinct behav-
iors were used to deal with such events as death, serious illness, perverse
misfortune, and occasionally life-crises like birth, marriage, or divorce,
as well as, naturally, the ritual life of defined communities gathered
at the church, synagogue, house meeting, prayer circle, or meditation
group. In actual fact, family, jobs, and personal projects of service to
others were more obvious overarching systems of meaning; religion ap-
peared to be invoked simply to support them. Long Islanders’ delin-
eation and expectations of religion are not the same as those of other
places that could be described. Yet neither are these other places so
different that we cannot articulate similarities and differences. The com-
monality that allows for such articulations is the “principle of charity”
defined by Davidson, a particularly felicitous if provocative basis for any
new take on interpretation.
  “”
In even the most sophisticated literature on Chinese religion and cul-
ture, it is readily stated that the Chinese believe in spirits. Some Chinese
will say something like that, too, as I learned at a shamanic exorcism
down the block from where I lived in Taipei. After the bloodied shaman
was through with his spectral combat, and everyone was relaxing, the
apartment owner complained that she had heard there were no ghosts in
America, which seemed so unfair since large numbers of them kept both-
ering people in Taiwan. Analogously, there is the eloquent essay by the
early twentieth-century sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, entitled “The World
Without Ghosts,” where he recounts growing up surrounded by ghosts
 These two phrases are used by Maurice Bloch and Richard Rorty, respectively. See Maurice
Bloch, “Language, Anthropology andCognitive Science,”Man : (): –; andRichard
Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (New York: Penguin, ), xxix.
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who were as real to him as his many relatives. Fei used the ghost theme
to set up a thoughtful contrast between Chinese and American cultures.
As beliefs go, believing in spirits is not a particularly strange example, and
we are very accustomed to the holistic construction known as Chinese
religion, which can make such beliefs coherent among themselves and
understandable as a type of meaningful truth.
Yet if the Chinese “believe” in spirits in anything like the way my
Long Island community believed in papal authority, or even the way
Christian colleagues believe in a central doctrine like the divinity of
Jesus Christ, then the statement that the Chinese believe in ancestral
spirits is, at best, a very vague generalization that ignores everything
interesting. It ignores the great differences from one person to another,
awareness of the possibility of other positions, the individualized inner
juggling and tensions, as well as pragmatic non-judgments and refusals
to engage. Most language about belief, and about Chinese religion in
general, leaves little room for these features and certainly does not begin
to account for them.
There are, as you would imagine, many Chinese positions on spirits.
Just a sampling of the most famous and familiar ones can demonstrate
the complexity of believing, at least in regard to this one topic in Chinese
history. In the fifth century , for example, the sage Mo Tzu argued
that the degeneration of civilization since the sage-kings was due to only
one thing, doubt about the existence of ghosts and spirits. Those who
say “of course there are no spirits,” he argued, bewilder the people and
bring disorder to the empire. In fact, he continued, people can know
that spirits exist in exactly the same way that they know anything exists –
through reliable testimony, the consensus of textual sources that have
proven their authority in other matters, and personal experience by the
senses. Several centuries later, the Han dynasty writer, Wang Ch’ung,
made the opposite argument in order to refute Taoist teachings. With
 Fei Xiaotong, “The World Without Ghosts,” in R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee (eds.), Land
Without Ghosts (Berkeley: University of California Press, ), –.
 The purpose of such sweeping generalizations, so rarely noticed as such, may be to establish
a contrast that creates “Chinese-ness,” even for Fei Xiaotong. See “Acting Ritually: Evidence
from the Social Life of Chinese Rites” in Richard Fenn (ed.), Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of
Religion (London: Blackwell, ), – .
 For a provocative engagement of related issues, see Maurice E. F. Bloch, How We Think They
Think: Anthropological Approaches to Cognition, Memory, and Literacy (Boulder, CO: Westview, ).
 Mo Tzu, “On Ghosts,” in Victor Mair (ed.), The Columbia Anthology of Traditional Chinese Literature
(New York: Columbia University Press, ), –. These are, of course, exactly the reasons
that I “believe” in nuclear physics, space travel, many medical treatments, or the usefulness of
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what has been characterized by later readers as admirable rationalism,
Wang argued that “man is a creature.His rankmaybe ever so high . . . but
his nature does not differ from other creatures. There is no creature
who does not die” and soon become dust. Hence, for Wang Ch’ung,
there can be no ghosts, spirits, or gods. In the medieval period, Han Yü
(– ) admonished the emperor for his public attentions to the
“bone of the Buddha” in an essay that became well known among the
literati. Morewidespreadwere the ubiquitous tales of the supernatural,
such as those collected by Hung Mai in the twelfth century, which all
turned on the moment when someone who did not believe in spirits
personally experienced their intervention and came to realize the truth
of their existence.
Any village or urban neighborhood in China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong
also yields a wide spectrum of positions on spirits. What is important
about the variety, I think, is the evidence that individuals are very aware
of the number of possible opinions and thus have located their own
position – if it is clear enough to be called that – as amatter of some choice
anddeliberation.These people know that others hold different ideas, that
many reject the whole thing, that peoplemay act contradictorily, or some
feign belief for self-serving reasons. There is little to suggest that a belief
in spirits comes with the culture or is any one sort of belief. There is, in
other words, very little systematic coherence.
As interpreters of texts and cultures, scholars of religion know that a
Chinese text preaching filiality to one’s ancestral spirits cannot be taken
as descriptive of the actual state of cultural affairs inChina, anymore than
a Long Island sermon about loving the poor can be taken as descriptive
of Catholic life as it is really lived there. It is much more accurate, and
certainly more interesting, to read admonishments and affirmations as
argumentative practices, perhaps involving some complex sharing of
ideals, but not as representations of a static or coherent situation.
If we argue that a person’s options are still culturally limited in the
forms and degrees of belief possible, clearly the limit is much further
 Wang Ch’ung, “Taoist Untruths,” in Mair, The Columbia Anthology, – , esp. –.
 Han Yü, “Memorial on the Bone of the Buddha,” in various anthologies, including William
Theodore de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, ), –.
 See Robert Hymes, “Truth, Falsity, and Pretense in Sung China,” unpublished paper, which
engages a debate in circles that study Chinese philosophy and religion (notably, Chad Hanson,
A Taoist Theory of Chinese Thought [New York: Oxford University Press, ] and A. C. Graham,
Disputers of the Tao [Chicago: Open Court, ]) about whether “Chinese religion” is actually
concerned with “truth” or not.
Frankenberry, N. K. (Ed.). (2002). Radical interpretation in religion. ProQuest Ebook Central <a
         onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a>
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out or more blurred than we usually acknowledge. Of course, Chinese
culture is extremely diverse, and even by the medieval period it had
seen a great deal of cultural trafficking. Perhaps this plurality influenced
the boundaries of what could be thought in the culture, let alone what
constituted belief and its systemic coherence.Apossible counter-example
dealing with a relatively more isolated society is suggested by Renato
Rosaldo’s account of headhunting among the Ilongot. He implies little
or no debate, doubt, or discussion among the Ilongot about the efficacy,
and meaningfulness, of headhunting; but he does note discussions of
its necessity and periods when young men did not take heads prior to
marriage. If there is no evidence of various shades of conviction and
degrees of involvement in headhunting practices, then that would seem
to be an unusual situation warranting study as such.

All native statements about belief can be seen as concerned with the
nature (classifying and boundaries) of religion in the sense that people
on Long Island and in Beijing are constantly asking themselves what to
believe, how much to believe it, and with what specific investments or
commitments. This is true not just for so-called religious ideas, of course,
but also for personal affairs or economic andpoliticalmatters. People reg-
ularly ask questions that deal with what wemight call the cultural bound-
aries and definition of religion. There are some familiar examples, such
as the famous Rites Controversy provoked by the Jesuits in seventeenth-
century China, which revolved around the question whether ancestor
worship was religion as such and had to be abandoned by converts, or
 Rosaldo tried to explore the practice without the usual judgments of the time by attempting to see
the rationality of headhunting and by looking to find aspects of his own experience illuminated
by his encounter with Ilongot culture. See his Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis
(Boston: Beacon Press, ; ). In Ilongot Headhunting –, particularly , Rosaldo
describes the Ilongot concept of history and Ilongot unwillingness to accept the veracity of
stories of the past, as well as the lack of any uniformity to their accounts. “In general,” Rosaldo
writes, “Ilongots are unlikely to accept as true any narrative about events they neither saw for
themselves nor heard about from an eyewitness” (). Of course, in this passage Rosaldo is
assessing attitudes toward stories and explanations, not toward activities that are considered (by
whom?) central to the culture, like headhunting. In terms of comparative ethics, one approach to
all the other problems of cultural comparison and objectivity, Rosaldo has addressed the “ethics”
of Ilongot headhunting. In “Of Headhunters and Soldiers: Separating Cultural and Ethical
Relativism,” Santa Clara Magazine : (Fall ): –, Rosaldo argues that the acceptance of
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whether it was an aspect of customary etiquette and no more threaten-
ing to converts than the bow given in greeting. Of course, this was a
more critical question for the foreign missionaries than for most, though
not all, Chinese. A careful ethnography by Margery Wolf details the
extended deliberations in a small village in Taiwan over the question of
whether a particular woman was a shaman-to-be called by the spirits or
a batty and unsympathetic outsider to be shunned. Drawing on more
recent examples, members of the recently outlawed group, the Falundafa
(Falungong), to some extent like other qigong societies in China since the
s, have had to decide to what extent their practices are religious or
simply therapeutic physical exercises that do not threaten other religious
affiliations or fall under government control of religion. For various po-
litical reasons and agendas, their deliberations and articulated positions
are carefully calibrated to keep the line between religion and therapeutic
exercise more unclear than clear.
When a coherently organized systemization of beliefs is proposed by
a Chinese source, then a very specific argument is being made about the
way things really are. The creation of a broadly designed system of co-
herence is a particular rhetorical project, one undertaken indigenously
as well as by outside scholars. And the difference between the practices
of these two groups is, perhaps, one of the many distinctions that should
lose its importance in our analyses. For example, coherence is an im-
portant part of the argument made by a subset of Chinese texts known
as morality books (shanshu), which emerged in twelfth-century China
among the opportunities of easy wood-block printing, inexpensive pa-
per, and manageable distribution; they are still produced and circulated
today. These texts are explicitly engaged in an enormous polemical effort
to provide a totally comprehensive and coherent understanding of the
workings of the world, both visible and invisible, in terms of universal and
inexorable laws of cosmic retribution – despite evidence available to all
that appears to contradict such a system. In this project, these morality
books reinterpret a wide variety of local and regional practices in terms
 On the rites controversy, see David E. Mungello, ed., The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and
Meaning (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, ); Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci
(New York: Viking, ) and The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton, ); and
Lionel M. Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism (Durham: Duke University Press,  ).
 SeeMargeryWolf, “TheWomanWhoDidn’t Become a Shaman,” in A Thrice Told Tale (Stanford
University Press, ), –.
 Catherine Bell, “Exercise, Ritual, and Political Dissent: The Falun Gong,” untitled volume, ed.
Christoph Wulf, Surkamp, forthcoming, .
 For an example of what this might look like as analysis, see Susan Friend Harding’s The Book of
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of a system said to underlie the otherwise incoherent or incomplete
cosmologies attributed to Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and folk
religion. As such, this project often echoes scholarly studies that present
a coherent overview, at least more coherent than the last scholarly
attempt, of a definable cultural tradition, although such overviews can
be found particularly unhelpful come a real encounter with some aspect
of the said tradition.
As a type of test of the hypothesis I am proposing, one can look again
at a well-known example of an underlying and apparently determinative
cultural structure, namely, Arthur Wolf ’s ethnographic account of the
different grades of spirit currency burned to ghosts, ancestors, and gods –
coarse yellow paper, paper with a silver appliqué, and finer paper with a
gold appliqué, respectively. Although focusing on one part of Taiwanese
rural society, Wolf argued that this system of paper types demonstrates a
more basic and wider cultural understanding of the organization of the
cosmos, one “that mirrors the social landscape of its adherents.” His
ethnography is often cited as evidence of a latent structure inChinese folk
practice, in reference to which a particular belief, such as the existence
of ancestral spirits, makes sense to people and accounts for a variety of
related actions. However, it is equally persuasive, and correct, to argue
that Wolf represented this practice as more coherent and routine than
it really was or is. Extended ethnographic observation adds so many
qualifications and regional differences that the original assertion can be
regarded, at best, as heavily generalized, that is, as much suggestive as
descriptive.
Several sociological studies have attempted to assess the degree of
coherence among the beliefs to which people are willing to attest, and
their results reinforce each other: there is surprisingly little coherence
among people’s formulated beliefs and it decreases as one moves from
more educated and articulate people, comfortable with narrative or
 What is most striking about these texts is not their cosmic message, but their juxtaposition of
esoteric talismanic properties with mass distribution. See Catherine Bell, “Printing and Religion
in China: Some Evidence from the Taishang ganying pian,” Journal of Chinese Religions  (Fall ):
– and “ ‘A Precious Raft to Save the World’: The Interaction of Scriptural Traditions and
Printing in a Chinese Morality Book,” Late Imperial China  : ( June ): –.
 Arthur P. Wolf, “Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors,” in Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society (Stanford
University Press, ), –, particularly .
 I develop this argument, citing the conflicting ethnographic studies, with regard to the “universal”
Chinese practice of domestic ancestor worship in Bell, “Performance,” in Mark Taylor (ed.),
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abstract categories, to the less-educated, who are not as apt to use
them. Two of these studies also inquired into the “meaning” of various
ritual practices and found little consensus among the explanations given,
even when people were asked about ritual features that had well-known,
even memorized, doctrinal explanations associated with them. Instead
of these formalized and accessible explanations of belief, which infor-
mants could volunteer when pressed, people routinely preferred to use
their own, fairly personal “takes,” which used very loosely related ideas
and claimed to be rooted in experience.
My own research into ritual activity tends to make me think of be-
liefs not as something prior to or separate from action, that is, not as
something mental, cognitive, or linguistic in opposition to the physical
or active. If there are habits of the body, there can be habits of thought
and expression as well as speech and self-presentation. They are all social
activities. While I use terms like “religion” – albeit with all the histori-
cal qualifications and hesitations shared by others – when talking about
Chinese materials, the language of belief seems more distorting, in par-
ticular, by specifically imposing a false sense of coherence, conviction,
systemization, and meaning. We cannot appeal to “belief ” to describe
how people exist within their cultures; yet without “belief,” it is not clear
what we mean by “religion.” If it seems easier to talk about Chinese
religion, rather than Chinese beliefs, it may be simply because one is
more comfortable today attributing a working coherence among cul-
tural phenomena rather than implying the illusion and falsity of specific
ideas.
This problem brings up an interesting association, namely, the strange
fortunes of what would seem to be a particularly Chinese “bundle of
behaviors,” the prognostications of feng shui (wind andwater), which are
ubiquitous in California and becoming familiar elsewhere in the United
States. Going beyond the dabbling of “new-agers” or the concerns of
transplanted Chinese, feng shui is also being used by all sorts of serious
people as a type of back-up system of cosmic control and insurance. It
is possible that one day we may compare its global spread to such other
cultural practices as food spicing and teadrinking.A similar phenomenon
 See David K. Jordan, “The jiaw of Shigaang (Taiwan): An Essay in Folk Interpretation,” Asian
Folklore Studies : (): – ; Peter Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass
Publics,” in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, ), –;
and Peter Stromberg, “Consensus and Variation in the Interpretation of Religious Symbolism:
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canbe seen in the enduringpopularity of theAsianmartial arts, especially
taiqi, begun in the late s and early s, or Japanese Zen meditation,
begun in the s. Feng shui, taiqi, and zazen are closely tied to ritual
postures considered very basic to Chinese and Japanese culture, yet they
have been readily translated to the more pluralist sections of American
society.The viable translatability and subsequent longevity of these sets of
practices indicate the existence of something not readily caught in either
universals or particulars, something bothmore durable andmutable and
much less hindered by incoherence with other sets of practice.
In short, such packaged sets of behaviors blur “religion” as such. As
a feature of a global society and culture, the translatability of feng shui,
taiqi, and zazen is evidence of cultural properties going in many direc-
tions – perhaps too many for our notions of religion and culture to track.
In the end, religion may vanish as any sort of empirical entity in one
place, only to emerge in another, as attested by the growing numbers of
Christian evangelicals in Beijing as well as the government officials try-
ing to control them with a stretched classification schema. To appreciate
these issues is to be more fully historical in our understanding and use
of theoretical categories.
Feng shui is not particularly illuminatedbybeing regarded as a belief or
part of a more comprehensive religion, terms that return to the defining
polarities of universalism and particularism. Nor do the activities of
members of the Falundafa fit traditional theories of religion, although
they do evoke many older models in Chinese history. Theorists do not
need to stop using the terms belief and religion, but their historical freight
must be made part of them. And theorists do not need to stop theorizing,
of course – after all, it is a distinct cultural practice to seek universal
explanations and doing so must be as legitimate as offering incense to
one’s ancestors – as long as no one gets hurt. But the coherence or
incoherence of practices can be explored on a more realistic footing if
scholarship can let go of the transcendent status still clutched by Shweder
and the quest for a logically prior theory of interpretation still sought by
Davidson.Without the panorama provided by these perspectives, we will
have to spend a lot more time figuring out how to situate ourselves, but
the alternatives do not seem to take us very far either.
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a>
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